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Can normal science—in the Kuhnian sense—add something substantial to the discussion about
the measurement problem? Does an extended Wigner’s-friend Gedankenexperiment illustrate new
issues? Or a new quality of known issues? Are we led to new interpretations, new perspectives, or do
we iterate the previously known? The recent debate does, as we argue, neither constitute a turning
point in the discussion about the measurement problem nor fundamentally challenge the legitimacy
of quantum mechanics. Instead, the measurement problem asks for a reflection on fundamental
paradigms of doing physics.
I. THE (EXTENDED) MEASUREMENT
PROBLEM
Classical mechanics allows for a transparent picture of
the world: If the physical states were its furniture, then
the thing-in-itself would be immediately accessible: Mo-
mentum and position of massive objects were, in princi-
ple, not barred from immediate and simultaneous percep-
tual access. Physics provided a powerful language: There
were seemingly no boundaries to what it could describe—
and with that: tame. Since the wake of quantum me-
chanics, the idea of an immediately accessible underlying
reality described by physical theories has gotten cracks.
One of the problems besides non-locality [1] and contex-
tuality [2]: The quantum-mechanical formalism cannot
simply be extended to an exhaustive description of the
observer—if it were extended, then what would we make
of an observer in a superposition state?
The problem is commonly exemplified with the
Wigner’s-friend experiment [3, 4]: Wigner performs a
measurement on a joint isolated system S ⊗ F contain-
ing his friend F who, in turn, measures a system emitted
by a source S. If the measurement bases of Wigner and
his friend are chosen appropriately with respect to the
emitted source state, then the probability distribution of
Wigner’s measurement of S⊗F is ambiguous: It depends
on whether the friend’s measurement is considered to be a
quantum-mechanical evolution with a corresponding uni-
tary operator on the joint system or it is taken to induce a
“collapse” associated with a definite measurement result.
But what is the actual problem here? Is there a contra-
diction at the heart of the quantum-mechanical descrip-
tion? Is quantum mechanics in this sense fundamentally
broken? Is something wrong with quantum mechanics
rather than with the expectation of a physical theory de-
scribing the real thing-in-itself? The Frauchiger/Renner
article [5] seems to provide an affirmative answer: The
measurement problem is not just a peculiarity of quan-
tum mechanics being probabilistic; the problem can be
exemplified with a single-shot Gedankenexperiment—in
an extended Wigner’s-friend experiment. The authors
concluded in an earlier version that, therefore, “single-
world interpretations are inconsistent” [6, 7]. The con-
clusion relies on carrying over the inconsistency of a for-
malism to one possible interpretation [8].
Just as conclusions from an extended Wigner’s-friend
experiment to interpretations are in doubt, so are claims
that, because of the Gedankenexperiment, quantum me-
chanics is more troubled than it has been before. If quan-
tum mechanics is regarded as a probabilistic theory over a
non-distributive lattice [9], then it is not the probabilistic
trait that is problematic: The joint system F ⊗ S is in a
superposition, not a statistical mixture, as it might have
also been the case in a probabilistic theory over a Boolean
lattice. If it were in a statistical mixture, there would
not be a problem; it is the contextual character of a non-
distributive lattice that is essential to the measurement
problem.1 In this regard, it is secondary whether the
problem becomes apparent in one or merely in a limit of
multiple runs. So after the extended Wigner’s friend ex-
periment, quantum mechanics is just as broken as it has
been before—or not : If the terms “isolated system,” “in-
teraction,” and “measurement” are used carefully, there
is less of a problem [10, 11]. The problem merely appears
within a certain perspective—under certain unnecessary
assumptions.
Contextuality can be regarded as a consequence of sub-
jecting interactions themselves to experience [11], and,
thus, rendering them meaningful [12–14].2 Then, the
measurement problem is not a mere insufficiency of quan-
tum mechanics but rather inherent to particular require-
ments for physical theories—inherent to a specific way
of picturing the world. The measurement problem, thus,
1 The aspect reflects in the importance of the joint system F ⊗
S being isolated. Decoherence “dissolves” the problem: One
photon escaping from the friend’s lab suffices for the ambiguity
of the probability distribution to vanish.
2 Philosophy of language [12, 13] has excavated a circular and in-
tricate dependency between meaning on the one side, and ex-
perience on the other: A description of the world is meaningful
insofar as it reflects experience. Conversely, any perceived fea-
ture of the world is inherent to a particular way of describing
the world. Perceiving and describing the world cannot be sep-
arated. Our perceptions are not encoded in an extra-discursive
“language of nature” [14] but dependent on our ways of describ-
ing the world.
2begs to reflect on the basic assumption and aspirations
of doing physics.
II. THE “MEASUREMENT” PROBLEM
Maudlin’s reading of the measurement problem [15] is
the inconsistency of the following triad: (a) The time
evolution of isolated systems in quantum mechanics is
unitary;3 (b) measurement results are exclusively one of
several possible values; (c) quantum mechanics is com-
plete. Statements (a) and (b) are fairly undebated: The
first is a matter of definition4, and the latter a necessary
requirement for falsifying theories [17]. The last state-
ment (c), however, is a relict of the hegemonic aspirations
of physics rooted in a traditional understanding insinuat-
ing a correspondence of a theory’s symbols with reality:
A “measurement” does here not only mean an interac-
tion between two systems, but is the exhaustive descrip-
tion of an observation—the account of experience that
yields the normative empirical evidence for the validity
of physical theories, including, paradoxically, quantum
mechanics itself. If, however, there is no privileged lan-
guage, e.g., for reasons rooted in the nature of meaning
and reference [13, 18–21], then quantum mechanics does
not have such a privileged status either: The reduction
of an observation (a meaningful account of experience) to
symbols of a formal language is in doubt. A measurement
as an interaction between two systems is, in this regard,
not equivalent to an observation as an account of expe-
rience constitutive to meaning [10]: The measurement is
not so much of a problem, after all.
III. CHANGING PERSPECTIVE
Whether or not there is an actual problem that needs
to be solved, one may ask: What are the characteristics
of theories that are troubled by the measurement prob-
lem? Under which circumstances are we to expect a mea-
surement problem? What is so peculiar about quantum
mechanics that it gives rise to the “measurement prob-
lem”? What is so peculiar about classical mechanics that
it does not? If we cannot make sense of the measurement
problem, then what is a perspective in which we can?
If one requires (a) physical theories to account for
interactions so that they are empirically significant,
and (b) that an observation necessarily goes with such an
interaction, one can develop a language game that leads
to probabilistic and contextual theories [11]. A “Born
3 The corresponding statement in [15] refers to linear time evolu-
tion following from the Schro¨dinger equation. The inconsistency
arises merely if Wigner’s friend, measuring a system, is isolated,
and, thus, the evolution modelled by a unitary operator;
4 Collapse theories, such as GRW [16], give rise to different state-
ments and can, thus, be considered as formally different theories.
rule” that assigns probability weights to ordered sets of
measurements as well as the measurement problem nat-
urally accompany such theories. Then, in fact, classical
mechanics seems strange as it is a theory without the
ability to empirically trace the interaction—the causal
link—necessary for sensory perceptions: In classical me-
chanics, a system has determinate position and momen-
tum if it is sufficiently characterized. It is assumed that
“reading off” the value of position and momentum does
not rely on an interaction—and potentially disturbance
of the system—in a way that is captured by classical
mechanics itself.5 In fact, if it were, then the system’s
behavior would be indeterminate [23]. Thus, classical
mechanics does not provide the ability to detect mea-
surements. In other words: There is no key-agreement
protocol like “BB84” [24].
IV. KNOWLEDGE — POWER
Why is it appealing to embrace the last of Maudlin’s
statements, i.e., the assumption that quantum
mechanics—or any other physical theory, for that
matter—is complete? What tempts to believe that
quantum mechanics can provide an exhaustive de-
scription of an observer’s account of experience—that
quantum mechanics can excavate the “ultimate real
truth”? If physics, and in particular quantum mechanics,
is attributed a privileged access to reality, then physics
attains a special and powerful role. The unwillingness to
even raise doubts about the exhaustive completeness of
physical theories can be considered from a perspective
of power and influence: Such doubts might undermine
this special authority. The link between discursive
authority and a scientific language becomes apparent in
Foucault’s discourse analysis. For instance, the focus of
a “science of the subject” has been narrowed down on
sexuality—“[n]ot, however, by reason of some natural
property inherent in sex itself, but by virtue of the
tactics of power immanent in this discourse” [25, p. 70].
The result: “We have placed ourselves under the sign
of sex, but in the form of a Logic of Sex, rather than a
Physics. [. . . ] Whenever it is a question of knowing who
we are, it is this logic that henceforth serves as our mas-
ter key.” [25, p. 78] Sexuality could become the all-ruling
5 Dewey remarks that the quest for absolute and unchangeable
truth drives towards a “spectator theory:” “The common essence
of all these theories, in short, is that what is known is antecedent
to the mental act of observation and inquiry, and it totally un-
affected by these acts; otherwise it would not be fixed and un-
changeable. [. . . ] The object refracts light to the eye and is seen;
it makes a difference to the eye and to the person having an op-
tical apparatus, but none to the thing seen. The real object is
the object so fixed in its regal aloofness that it is a king to any
beholding mind that may gaze upon it. A spectator theory of
knowledge is the inevitable outcome.” [22, §1, p.26] The inter-
action assumption might not be perspective easily embraced by
physicists if it limits the ability to attain absolute knowledge.
3language because it attained the status of a science,
with a “logic” of its own, and the ability to produce
real and exhaustive knowledge. This iterates the myth
of a privileged access to reality and a derived privileged
discursive status of science—a political extension to the
myth of the given. But it reveals at the same time that
there is not one scientific language we are inevitably
converging to: Instead, it is a question of power tactics
what to put into the scientific focus—in this case, how
to choose a perspective onto the subject.
Does “putting ourselves under the sign of a Physics”
liberate us from the struggle for semantic authority? Fey-
erabend [26] and Kuhn [27] debunk the idea of physics
being somewhat “better” than other scientific disciplines.
And why should it be?6
It seems perfectly clear, at least since
Wittgenstein and Sellars, that the ‘mean-
ing’ of typographical inscription is not an ex-
tra ‘immaterial’ property they have, but just
their place in a context of surrounding events
in a language-game, in a form of life. This
goes for brain-inscriptions as well. [19, §1.2]
What are the consequences of embracing a linguistic
“master key” to knowledge and truth about the subject?
A new master key is game theory with its fundamental
paradigm of the rational and egoistic player—the homo
economicus. To conclusively “understand the subject,”
we merely have to know his objective function. The view
appeals also to physicists [28]. Schirrmacher7 investi-
gates [29, 30] how modelling the subject as an egoist
agent pursuing the maximum of his quantifiable objec-
tive is a discourse that produces egoists—a discourse that
unconditionally equates “sensible” with “egoistic.”8 If
we replace that key by artificial intelligence [31]: The
problem remains. The way we look at things or subjects
shapes what and how we see it.9 The search for absolute
truth has normalising, ordering, and narrowing effects.
We have been referring to subjects, complex human be-
ings. The described effects may not apply to the world
of physical objects governed by the physical laws discov-
ered by physics.10 On a fundamental level, we may still
“be” quantum systems. So are we then quantum brains-
in-a-vat, connected by quantum channels? Is all we ever
refer to—all we mean if we talk about things—eventually
not an external thing, but a quantum state [20]? This
undermines what we essentially consider “doing physics:”
1. Doing physics establishes meaning. It adds some-
thing to our language that is not inherent to it in
the first place.
2. The process of learning, understanding, and dis-
covering continues. Quantum mechanics—and its
current understanding—is not the end of physics.
We may expect—and search for—paradigm shifts
as they happened before.
Instead of trying to save quantum mechanics as the one
privileged access to reality, or taking the measurement
problem as an indicator that there must be another such
privileged access, we advocate a pragmatic—in a philo-
sophical sense—search for perspectives onto and descrip-
tions of the world out there. Any theory must have the
modesty to allow for something in our experience that it
cannot grasp. No theory can claim for itself to have ex-
haustively captured an observer’s account of experience,
while it draws legitimacy from experimental findings.11
Quantum mechanics is not the master key, but it is not
broken either.
6 If what we mean is not an immaterial property—as observed by
Rorty—, then we can also not conclude from some theory alone
on the conclusions of an observer, as demanded by “consistent
reasoning” in [5].
7 The epigraph of [29] is, not surprisingly, a quote from Foucault:
“We should not try to discover who we are, but instead who we
refuse to be.” [own translation]
8 “Das Problem ist, dass die Theorie nicht nur Handeln beschreibt,
sondern Handeln erzwingt, sie ist nicht nur deskriptiv sondern
normativ. Sie postuliert nicht nur Egoisten, sie produziert sie.
Die Rationalita¨t, die sie sich auf die Fahnen schreibt, kommt
nicht von selbst. [. . . ] Vernu¨nftiges Verhalten des Gegners
entsteht nicht durch vernu¨nftige Argumente, sondern durch Dro-
hung und Angst vor Vernichtung.” [29, §6] In short: Fear-
mongering aligns the agents with his game-theoretic model.
With the application of game theory to economics the agents
have shifted from states to persons—and so have the targets of
the alignment process.
9 Schirrmacher sees close links between the game-theoretic mod-
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